Determining the scope of attacks on health in four governorates of Syria in 2016: Results of a field surveillance program by Haar, Rohini J. et al.
University of Massachusetts Medical School 
eScholarship@UMMS 
Open Access Articles Open Access Publications by UMMS Authors 
2018-04-24 
Determining the scope of attacks on health in four governorates 
of Syria in 2016: Results of a field surveillance program 
Rohini J. Haar 
University of California - Berkeley 
Et al. 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://escholarship.umassmed.edu/oapubs 
 Part of the Equipment and Supplies Commons, Health Services Administration Commons, Health 
Services Research Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace 
Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons 
Repository Citation 
Haar RJ, Risko CB, Singh S, Rayes D, Albaik A, Alnajar M, Kewara M, Clouse E, Baker E, Rubenstein LS. 
(2018). Determining the scope of attacks on health in four governorates of Syria in 2016: Results of a field 
surveillance program. Open Access Articles. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002559. Retrieved 
from https://escholarship.umassmed.edu/oapubs/3440 
Creative Commons License 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. 
This material is brought to you by eScholarship@UMMS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Articles 
by an authorized administrator of eScholarship@UMMS. For more information, please contact 
Lisa.Palmer@umassmed.edu. 
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Determining the scope of attacks on health in
four governorates of Syria in 2016: Results of
a field surveillance program
Rohini J. Haar1*, Casey B. Risko2, Sonal Singh3, Diana Rayes4, Ahmad Albaik5,
Mohammed Alnajar5, Mazen Kewara5, Emily Clouse4, Elise Baker6, Leonard
S. Rubenstein4
1 School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley, California, United States of America,
2 Department of International Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore,
Maryland, United States of America, 3 Department of Medicine, University of Massachusetts Medical School,
Worcester, Massachusetts, United States of America, 4 Center for Public Health and Human Rights, Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America, 5 Syrian
American Medical Society, Gaziantep, Turkey, 6 Physicians for Human Rights, New York, New York, United
States of America
* rohinihaar@berkeley.edu
Abstract
Background
Violent attacks on and interferences with hospitals, ambulances, health workers, and
patients during conflict destroy vital health services during a time when they are most
needed and undermine the long-term capacity of the health system. In Syria, such attacks
have been frequent and intense and represent grave violations of the Geneva Conventions,
but the number reported has varied considerably. A systematic mechanism to document
these attacks could assist in designing more protection strategies and play a critical role in
influencing policy, promoting justice, and addressing the health needs of the population.
Methods and findings
We developed a mobile data collection questionnaire to collect data on incidents of attacks
on healthcare directly from the field. Data collectors from the Syrian American Medical Soci-
ety (SAMS), using the tool or a text messaging system, recorded information on incidents
across four of Syria’s northern governorates (Aleppo, Idleb, Hama, and Homs) from January
1, 2016, to December 31, 2016. SAMS recorded a total of 200 attacks on healthcare in
2016, 102 of them using the mobile data collection tool. Direct attacks on health facilities
comprised the majority of attacks recorded (88.0%; n = 176). One hundred and twelve
healthcare staff and 185 patients were killed in these incidents. Thirty-five percent of the
facilities were attacked more than once over the data collection period; hospitals were signif-
icantly more likely to be attacked more than once compared to clinics and other types of
healthcare facilities. Aerial bombs were used in the overwhelming majority of cases
(91.5%). We also compared the SAMS data to a separate database developed by Physi-
cians for Human Rights (PHR) based on media reports and matched the incidents to
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compare the results from the two methods (this analysis was limited to incidents at health
facilities). Among 90 relevant incidents verified by PHR and 177 by SAMS, there were 60
that could be matched to each other, highlighting the differences in results from the two
methods. This study is limited by the complexities of data collection in a conflict setting, only
partial use of the standardized reporting tool, and the fact that limited accessibility of some
health facilities and workers and may be biased towards the reporting of attacks on larger or
more visible health facilities.
Conclusions
The use of field data collectors and use of consistent definitions can play an important role in
the tracking incidents of attacks on health services. A mobile systematic data collection tool
can complement other methods for tracking incidents of attacks on healthcare and ensure
the collection of detailed information about each attack that may assist in better advocacy,
programs, and accountability but can be practically challenging. Comparing attacks
between SAMS and PHR suggests that there may have been significantly more attacks
than previously captured by any one methodology. This scale of attacks suggests that tar-
geting of healthcare in Syria is systematic and highlights the failure of condemnation by the
international community and medical groups working in Syria of such attacks to stop them.
Author summary
Why was this study done?
• There has been no systematic and consistent means to document attacks on health facil-
ities and health workers under international humanitarian law.
• This method differs from other methods by relying on definitions grounded in interna-
tional humanitarian law and field reporting by dedicated data collectors.
• This study was done to quantify how many attacks on healthcare there have been in
northern Syria, details of the attacks, risk factors for attack, and consequences.
What did the researchers do and find?
• Data collectors in the field reported information on attacks on hospitals, transports,
healthcare workers, and patients.
• A subset of these incidents (51%) were recorded on a standardized reporting tool using
a mobile phone application.
• We found that there were more than 200 attacks on healthcare in 2016 in four northern
governorates.
• In total, 112 health workers and 185 patients were killed in these incidents, and 176 of
the attacks were on hospitals and other healthcare facilities.
Attacks on health in Syria in 2016
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• We compared data to another database maintained by PHR to show that no one meth-
odology is capturing all of the incidents that have occurred.
What do these findings this mean?
• These numbers shed light on the extent of attacks on civilian health infrastructure and
personnel in Syria.
• The study suggests that the utilization of a standard reporting tool can contribute to the
depth and quality of the reported data, especially in capturing incidents that may not be
found using media data.
• It also suggests that this method requires intensive training and support resources for
successful implementation.
• The comparison between SAMS and PHR databases suggests that multiple methods of
tracking attacks may be needed to identify all incidents.
• The study also highlights the need for more research and advocacy towards accountabil-
ity and stopping the attacks.
Introduction
Acts of violence against healthcare facilities, transports, medical personnel, and patients are
frequent but underreported in armed conflict [1–4]. Clinics, hospitals, private medical offices,
and transports such as ambulances and supply trucks have been bombed, looted, blocked, or
occupied worldwide [5–7]. Healthcare personnel and patients have been arrested, killed,
maimed, tortured, interrogated, and blocked from receiving or providing care. Even bombings
and shelling of hospitals sometimes go unreported, and other attacks, such as looting, obstruct-
ing passage at checkpoints, and threats to healthcare workers are usually not systematically
tracked [8,9]. Attacks on health workers, facilities, and transports, and on the wounded and
sick, violate international human rights law and international humanitarian law [10–12].
Recent resolutions from the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the UN General
Assembly have reiterated the vital importance of protecting health during conflict and the
need for data to track attacks [13,14]. It is well recognized, however, that no systematic data
collection on attacks on healthcare services in conflicts has existed, though the World Health
Organization (WHO) is beginning such an effort in 11 countries in 2017 based on a mandate
from the World Health Assembly in 2012 [15,16]. Where data is collected on such attacks, def-
initions of what constitutes an attack vary considerably, and in many cases, only secondary
data is collected [4].
Since the Syrian conflict began in 2011, an unprecedented number of attacks on hospitals
and health workers has been reported [17–22] using various methods and approaches
[21,23,24] and with different results. Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), a nonprofit human
rights organization based in New York, has developed the most comprehensive publicly avail-
able registry and mapping of attacks on health facilities in Syria and has documented and veri-
fied more than 465 instances of attacks on healthcare facilities since March 2011 [25,26]. PHR
collects data only on health facilities, excluding attacks on patients, medical personnel other
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than those killed or injured in facility attacks, and obstructions of access. It uses a methodology
that examines press reports, social media posts, and other open-source information to corrob-
orate reported attacks on healthcare facilities but does not collect data directly on the ground
[24]. WHO and the UN Health Cluster for northern Syria, located in Turkey, have reported
attacks on health services in Syria and elsewhere using reports submitted by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and other partners and verifying them (the Syrian American Medical
Society [SAMS] is part of the UN Health Cluster) [23,27]. Medecins Sans Frontiers [28], the
Syrian Network for Human Rights [29], and the Violations Documentation Center [30] also
make efforts to report on attacks using different methods but without common definitions
[31–33].
There is widespread recognition that many attacks are not reported due to ongoing conflict,
difficulty in accessing the site to gain quality information, or lack of clarity on what constitutes
an attack [34]. Furthermore, when attacks are documented, reports often lack information
about the extent of damage, the number of healthcare personnel and patients killed and/or
injured, and operational status. Because of the use of varying definitions, some methods do
not capture threats against and arrests of health workers, restrictions on patients’ access to
care, and other incidents that violate the provisions of international law demanding respect for
and protection of health services. SAMS, with assistance from our research team, runs a unique
program enlisting local data collectors in regions of Syria where it supports healthcare services
to identify and characterize incidents in detail. Data from this program have been used to
inform local and international advocacy efforts[35] and are shared as well with WHO’s health
cluster for northern Syria.
This study sought to implement and test a method of collecting field data on the scope of
and details about the attacks based on direct field reporting using questions centered on inter-
national human rights and humanitarian law. We also aimed to identify any characteristics
that increase or mitigate vulnerability of healthcare facilities. We hoped to use this opportunity
to evaluate the utility of a standardized field survey tool for documenting these attacks. To con-
textualize this documentation system, we aimed to compare the data to PHR’s database that
uses media reports to track attacks on hospitals.
Methods
We developed a standardized reporting questionnaire to document attacks on health in Syria
based on a previously validated survey for tracking attacks on healthcare in Myanmar and
grounded in the requirements of and definitions from international human rights and human-
itarian law [36]. These laws demand that in times of armed conflict, combatants respect and
protect the wounded and sick as well as health facilities, health workers, and transports; allow
the flow of humanitarian aid; and refrain from punishing persons engaged in medical work in
accordance with their ethical duties [11]. The questionnaire was adapted for use in Syria, using
domains for attacks on facilities, health workers, transports, and patients, and underwent
numerous iterations based on pilot data and feedback on accuracy, clarity, and conciseness
from within the research team, as well as from data collectors and SAMS data managers based
in Gaziantep, Turkey.
The questions covered attacks on four domains based on the requirements of law: (1)
healthcare facilities and other settings where medical services could be provided (medical
offices, laboratories, clinics, hospitals, forensic centers, and blood banks); (2) healthcare trans-
ports, including ambulances and vehicles carrying supplies and equipment; (3) healthcare per-
sonnel, including physicians, nurses, allied health professionals, and others providing clinical
services; and (4) patients, both those that are already under care and those that seek care. The
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questionnaire also requested detailed information about an incident, including information
about the victims; the perpetrator(s); date, time, and location; intentionality; type(s) of facili-
ties; descriptions of the attack and type(s) of violence and weapon(s); damage inflicted; impact
on functionality and service capacity; injuries; and deaths among patients and healthcare per-
sonnel, as well as narrative and image fields (the data collection tool is available from authors
upon request). The questionnaire was translated into Arabic by the research team and verified
by at least two other native Arabic speakers to ensure accuracy and clarity but, given resource
limitations, was not formally back-translated. Revisions were discussed and made by
consensus.
The questionnaire was uploaded to a computer-based data collection application developed
by the Magpi Mobile Data Service (Magpi) [37] and further edited for use on the mobile plat-
form. The application allowed offline entry and GPS stamping of the response location. It also
permits customizable questionnaires that use skip logic and dropdown lists for ease of use and
to help ensure reliability and standardization (S1 Fig). Data collectors in the field in northern
Syria were able to use the Magpi application to answer the questions via mobile phone, and data
managers in Turkey and the United States could view real-time reports based on the responses
on computers as well as mobile devices. The Magpi application-based questionnaire (referred to
as the “tool”) was chosen for its data security features, ability for offline entry of responses, the
ease of mobile incident documentation, and real-time uploading and analysis of the data.
Data collection
SAMS has documented attacks on health since 2014 in four northern governorates of Syria
where it supports health services: Aleppo, Idleb, Homs, and Hama. These governorates have
been the site of intense violence since the beginning of the war, with frequent attacks on civil-
ian infrastructure, including health services [38]. The reporting tool was made available to data
managers working for SAMS in Gaziantep, which hired data collectors and oversaw data col-
lection since mid-2015. SAMS hired eight individuals who live in both rural and urban regions
of Syria and represented all areas of these four governorates. Data collectors were recruited by
SAMS field offices in each governorate based on their geographical knowledge, communica-
tion skills, and technical aptitude related to data collection. The data collectors were authorized
to work by local health directorates. Data collectors were trained by the research team through
its office in Gaziantep, Turkey. Training topics included mobile reporting (using the tool on
smart phones); basic concepts of the law of protection and respect for healthcare; ethical issues
in data collection; security issues; and self-care. Because of the security situation inside Syria
and the difficulty of traveling across the Syria–Turkey border, data collectors engaged in online
refresher trainings with the research team with ongoing communication and support with
SAMS data managers in Gaziantep as well as field officers in their respective governorates in
Syria. Periodic review of the database by the research team informed discussions with the
SAMS officers on addressing any problems with the data collection mechanism.
Each data collector was responsible for reporting on attacks in a specified geographical
range where they lived. Data collectors identified incidents through a variety of methods,
including mobile communication with fellow staff in SAMS-supported hospitals and the large
network of health service providers in Syria, as well as the SAMS data managers who were
notified of incidents directly by health workers, hospital administrators, witnesses, or through
the health cluster.
Once an incident was identified, the regional data collector visited the site of attack and
sought out hospital staff, administrators, and witnesses to corroborate the incident and com-
plete the survey. Data collectors were trained to only report on incidents after the attack had
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completely ceased and the area was secured. The data collectors interviewed informants using
the reporting tool question fields and captured photographs and video of the incident, if rele-
vant. They communicated basic information about the incident with SAMS data managers
through a secure messaging system and were encouraged to characterize the full details of the
incident using the Magpi program. SAMS data managers in Gaziantep oversaw the documen-
tation process on each report and clarified any incomplete information with the data collec-
tors. Data managers were responsible for verifying incidents with the health cluster network
and with their personnel inside Syria. SAMS corroborated all incidents and details with multi-
ple sources, including reports from other health staff, witnesses, and the health cluster, as well
as video and photographs. Discrepancies in the data were reviewed by data collectors and data
managers, and further investigation of those incidents was conducted using the resources
described above.
Data analysis
The research team conducted analysis on the data collected using Magpi (51% of the inci-
dents), as well as incident reports received via other forms of communication, such as messag-
ing applications, emails, and personal communication. We attempted to understand trends in
the data and study any variables that may have posed increased vulnerability for damage or
injury. We looked at the times and dates of all incidents, presence of a red cross or other medi-
cal emblem, types of attacks and weapons, numbers of dead and wounded, resulting damage
to a hospital and where damage took place, and the amount of time it was closed or had limited
services. For targeted attacks on personnel and patients, we analyzed the type of attack and
resulting injuries, deaths, and disabilities. We also compared hospital location and size to the
frequency of attacks and the resulting damage to the facility and related casualties. Pearson
chi-squared analysis was conducted to identify risk differences between groups throughout the
analysis. This test was chosen because of its relevance to unpaired categorical data. We also
attempted to understand challenges in using the mobile systematic data collection tool and
reasons that data collectors did not use the mechanism for all incidents. We conducted analysis
of the data using Stata v 14.4 (http://www.stata.com).
Comparing incidents
We compared attacks that SAMS collected with incidents confirmed by PHR in 2016 [26].
This analysis only included attacks on health facilities because PHR’s database does not include
data on the other domains. SAMS and PHR use different methods to identify and verify attacks
on health facilities. While SAMS uses its own data collectors, field personnel, and data manag-
ers, PHR uses open sources such as media reports and social media posts to identify incidents.
There are differences in the geographical scope and the methods of collection in PHR’s and
SAMS’ datasets. PHR collects data on health facilities across all governorates in Syria, whereas
the SAMS data came from only four northern governorates that were at least partially con-
trolled by opposition groups. Another difference is that SAMS data collectors focused on all
four domains of attack, including targeted attacks on individuals and healthcare personnel
independent of an attack on a health facility or transport, whereas the PHR database does not
include direct attacks on transports, personnel, or patients. While comparison of the databases
has limits (highly destructive incidents or those on larger facilities may have a higher probabil-
ity of capture than less-damaging incidents), we hoped to put the SAMS data in the context of
the current publicly available data on attacks on health.
PHR identifies and confirms incidents of attacks on health facilities using information from
open sources, including, “United Nations, governmental, news agency, and non-governmental
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organization reports; journal articles; dissertations; social media and video sites; blogs; TV
news footage; and reports produced inside Syria from the government or non-state armed
groups,” as well as using information from field sources in Syria and the region [36]. PHR also
employs a verification system that requires at least three independent sources to report on an
incident in detail in order to corroborate each incident. PHR notes that because of their pro-
cess, the number of incidents they report on is likely an underestimation of the total attacks on
health facilities; in 2016, PHR only corroborated one-third of the reports of attacks on medical
facilities they received and investigated (personal communication, PHR Research Staff Mar-
ianne Mollman, 2017). Only PHR’s confirmed reports were compared to attacks on facilities
in the SAMS database and matched based on the following elements: (1) date, (2) location, and
(3) name of healthcare facility. Investigators also scrutinized the type of attack and narrative
details when this information was unclear or there were discrepancies between reports from
PHR and data collected by SAMS. All documented incidents were categorized as follows:
• Definite match: If the date of attack, location of attack, and name of facility match. We
allowed for 24-hour variation in date as might be attributed to a reporting delay.
• Probable match: If two out of the three (date, location, and name) matched. If the date was
not an exact match, it needed to be within one week of the other.
• Possible match: If location or name of the hospital matched and the date was within one
week of each other.
• Unique incident: Any incidents that do not match into any of the above category.
We considered utilizing the capture–recapture analysis to calculate an estimate of the total
number of incidents [39,40]. However, given the practical challenges of ensuring that both
databases are completely independent and identifying all possible colinearity among the data-
bases, capture–recapture calculation of the total number of estimated incidents based on these
databases has significant limitations and is not presented.
Human subjects review
SAMS collected data as part of its ongoing work to provide health services to people in Syria.
The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board approved
analysis of secondary data. To guarantee the confidentiality of data collectors and protect the
identity of the facilities, no individual identifiers, names, or specific locations are used in this
analysis.
Results
SAMS recorded 200 incidents of attacks on healthcare in 2016. Of those, 102 (51.0%) had com-
pleted reports on the Magpi application that allowed for more in-depth analysis. The attacks
took place in the four northern governorates of Syria: Aleppo (n = 122), Idleb (n = 49), Homs
(n = 17), and Hama (n = 12) from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2016 (Table 1). Of these,
we note that the majority involved aerial bombing of hospitals (91.5%; n = 183, including
chemical bombs [n = 7]). Sixty-one percent (n = 122) of all attacks took place in Aleppo Gover-
norate, of which 66.4%(n = 81) took place in Aleppo City.
All attacks on health
We found attacks on all four domains within the SAMS database: facilities, transports, person-
nel, and patients. There were 176 incidents that primarily involved healthcare facilities, 16 that
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primarily involved transports and eight that primarily involved personnel. At least one attack
was documented in every month except March 2016 (Fig 1). We note that there was significant
overlap among the domains: Within the 176 attacks on facilities, there were 69 that involved
patients, 56 that involved personnel, and 44 that involved transports. There were no reports of
direct targeting of patients in the data, though patients were injured and wounded in attacks
on facilities and transports. Although we note that there were significant civilian casualties
reported with nearly all of these attacks, our focus was limited to attacks on health systems, so
we did not collect data on civilian injuries and deaths outside of healthcare personnel and
patients present at the time of the attack. Overall, 297 deaths of healthcare professionals
(37.7%; n = 112) and patients (62.3%; n = 185) were documented. An additional 433 injuries
were documented among healthcare personnel (21.7%; n = 94) and patients (78.3%; n = 339).
Overall, 30.0% (n = 60) of the incidents resulted in at least one injury and 34.5% (n = 69) in at
least one death. Of the 90 incidents that involved at least one casualty (death or injury), the
average number of deaths was 3.3 per incident, and 4.8 persons were injured per incident
(including both healthcare personnel and patients).
Attacks on personnel. There were eight incidents in which healthcare personnel were
attacked independent of strikes on facilities or transports. Among the personnel targeted, five
incidents involved aerial bombs that hit physicians or other staff outside a hospital and one
incident involved a physician who was shot by snipers and another killed by a landmine explo-
sion. One incident involved the targeting of staff with chlorine gas.
Fig 1. Number of incidents and casualties documented by SAMS (N = 200) by month (2016).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002559.g001
Table 1. Geographical distribution (%) of incidents by governorate.
Governorate Incidents Casualties (deaths + injuries)
Hama 12 (6%) 12 (1.8%)
Homs 17 (8.5%) 45 (6.7%)
Aleppo 122(61%) 428 (63.5%)
Idleb 49(24.5%) 189 (28.0%)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002559.t001
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Attacks on facilities and transports. Of the 176 incidents involving healthcare facilities,
the majority (n = 120, 68.2%) involved hospitals. Outpatient clinics (n = 25), medical points
(n = 4), and medical education facilities (nursing or medical schools, n = 3) were also attacked.
Ancillary facilities (n = 24) included forensic centers, blood banks, specialty centers for physi-
cal therapy or preventative care, and medical administration (Table 2).
Ninety-four distinct facilities were attacked, of which 33 (35.0%) were attacked more than
once in 2016 alone, accounting for 115 of the 176 attacks on facilities. Hospitals attacked more
than once averaged 3.5 attacks in 2016. Two health facilities were attacked more than 10 times;
both were large hospitals in Aleppo City. Hospitals were significantly more likely to be
attacked more than once than other types of facilities (p< 0.01).
Sixteen of the recorded incidents targeted health transports. Fourteen of these targeted
ambulances, and two were attacks on convoys. Most of the attacks on transports (87.5%;
n = 14) were the result of aerial bombs. One ambulance was shelled by ground artillery, and
another was physically attacked and looted.
Systematic survey analysis
We conducted an in-depth analysis of additional incident information gathered using the 102
incidents collected on the mobile systematic data collection tool. While the reasons for not uti-
lizing the standardized tool for all incidents were not quantitatively addressed as part of this
research, qualitative interviews with the field data collectors and data managers suggested a
few challenges. They noted that the questionnaire on the mobile phone application took more
time (approximately 15 minutes) than recording basic information, and the platform itself
proved more challenging to use than we anticipated. They also noted that the use of a phone to
document data appeared unfamiliar and disconcerting to some of the interviewees, who pre-
ferred a conversation to answering standardized questions.
Based on Pearson chi-squared testing, there were no notable differences in the domain
(p = 0.995), location (p = 0.075), type of attack (p = 0.995), and total casualties (p = 0.08)
between those attacks that were documented using the tool and those that were reported using
the text messaging system. Of the 102 attacks recorded using the data collection tool, 90 were
primarily attacks on facilities, eight on transports, and four on personnel. We found that data
collectors spoke directly with healthcare personnel in 16 incidents, as well as other victims
and/or witnesses who were not clinicians (usually hospital administrators) in 86 of the
incidents.
We ascertained the level of damage resulting from the attacks as well as the ability of facili-
ties and transports to function afterwards. Eighty-nine percent (n = 80) of the 90 health facili-
ties were damaged (major damage: 37.5%; moderate damage: 27.5%; minimal damage: 35.0%)
as a result of the attack. Forty-nine facilities (54.4%) were forced to close for various lengths of
time (11 were forced to close for two weeks or more and eight were closed permanently).
Table 2. Type of medical domain attacked (n = 200).
Domain Sub-Domain Attacks (percentage)
Health Facilities Hospital 120 (60)
Clinic 25 (12.5)
Medical Point 4 (2)
Ancillary Services 24 (12)
Health Transports 16 (8)
Health Personnel 8 (4)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002559.t002
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Attacks that caused major damage did not have significantly more casualties (p< 0.349) compared
to those with moderate and minimum damage. However, facilities with major damage were signif-
icantly more at risk of being closed (p< 0.001). Fourteen percent (n = 13) of facilities had a red
cross, red crescent, or other medical emblem; there was no significant difference in repeated attacks
(p = 0.208) or probability of closure (p = 0.558) between hospitals with and without emblems.
The mobile data-collecting platform also allowed for more nuanced understanding of over-
lapping domains of attack. Although there were 16 documented attacks primarily on trans-
ports in the full dataset and eight attacks primarily on transports in the systematic data
collection subset, there were a total of 35 incidents involving attacks on transports within the
102 incidents in the subset analysis. Thirty-four of 35 of these involved aerial attacks on the
transports (the remaining was secondary to artillery). Ten of these attacks (28.6%) occurred
while the ambulance was in transit. Eighty-six percent (n = 30) of the ambulances were taken
out of service as a result of the attack, including 37.1% (n = 13) that were permanently
destroyed. Eleven (31.4%) of the 35 ambulance systems displayed emblems.
As part of the analysis, we assessed various risk factors for increased frequency of attack,
increased damage, injury, or death. We found that 27.0% of the documented attacks on facili-
ties were on large tertiary care centers. These major hospitals were significantly more likely to
be attacked more than once, as compared to other hospitals and clinics (average of 3.3 attacks
versus 1.5 attacks, p = 0.026 utilizing the unpaired t test statistic). Although the incidents
recorded occurred at all times of the day, a significantly higher proportion (370%; p< 0.01)
occurred in the early morning hours, specifically between the hours of 05:00 and 08:00. We
investigated differences in deaths (p = 0.149), presence of damage(p = .589), extent of damage
(p = .363), and resulting closure between type of facility (p = .246). The only significant differ-
ence was among number of injuries (p< 0.002), but overall, there was no significant difference
between facility types in these outcomes (Table 3).
Incident comparison
We compared incidents at facilities to a database of confirmed attacks from PHR. We only
included verified incidents from the PHR database to ensure that we presented analysis using
the highest quality of data. For our comparative analysis, we only used incidents that met the
following criteria: (1) in the four northern governorates, (2) involving attacks on facilities, and
(3) confirmed PHR reports. Excluding incidents that did not fit this criteria, we identified 89
Table 3. Comparisons of consequences between types of facility.
Type of Facility
Field Hospital number
(percentage)
Primary Health Center number
(percentage)
Other number
(percentage)
Total number
(percentage)
P value (chi-
squared)
Incidents with
Injuries
Yes 16 (45.7) 37 (80.4) 12 (80) 65 (67.7) 0.002
No 19 (54.3) 9 (19.6) 3 (20) 31 (32.3)
Incidents with Deaths Yes 19 (54.3) 34 (73.9) 11 (73.3) 64 (66.7) 0.149
No 16 (45.7) 12 (26.1) 4 (26.7) 32 (33.3)
Incidents Damaging
Facilities
Yes 2 (5.7) 5 (10.9) 2 (14.3) 9 (9.5) 0.589
No 33 (94.3) 41 (89.1) 12 (85.7) 86 (90.5)
Extent of Damage Minimum 12 (36.4) 19 (46.3) 2 (16.7) 33 (38.5) 0.363
Moderate 11 (33.3) 14 (34.2) 5 (41.7) 30 (34.9)
Major 10 (30.3) 8 (19.5) 5 (41.7) 23 (26.7)
Forced To Close Yes 13 (37.1) 24 (55.8) 6 (42.9) 43 (46.7) 0.246
No 22 (62.9) 19 (44.2) 8 (57.1) 49 (53.3)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002559.t003
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attacks confirmed by PHR and 177 reported by SAMS data collectors in 2016 (one incident
that was documented primarily as a transport attack in the SAMS database was reported as a
confirmed attack on a facility and a transport system in the PHR database). In one case, an
incident in the PHR database was documented as two separate attacks (on a hospital and on an
affiliated administrative complex with health workers). We therefore adjusted the PHR inci-
dent number to 90 be conservative (Table 4). We were able to identify 52 definite matches and
8 probable matches among the databases. There were 30 unique incidents in the PHR dataset
that were not available in the SAMS dataset and 117 in the SAMS dataset that were not found
in the PHR dataset. Because of the limitations in avoiding colinearity among the databases, we
did not calculate an estimated total number of possible incidents.
Discussion
This study confirms the large number of attacks on health, particularly on health facilities, con-
sistent with both PHR’s and WHO/Health Cluster findings for the period covered. The 200
attacks SAMS found in a region with fewer than 200 hospitals is a tragic testament to the long-
term destruction of the health system in Syria. Using a prospective surveillance methodology,
we found that most of the incidents impacted multiple domains; killing or injuring patients
and personnel as well as destroying transport capacities while targeting a hospital was frequent.
We also found that the personnel and patient casualties consistently rose and fell with the fre-
quency of hospital attacks over time. During the period covered, hospitals in the city of Aleppo
suffered a significant portion of the attacks. Repeat attacks on hospitals were frequent and
highlight the vulnerability of these facilities, especially larger centers, to bombardment, possi-
bly because they are easily visualized and identified. Many other types of facilities, such as
medical schools and blood banks, were also attacked or destroyed. While we identified primar-
ily infrastructure attacks, many staff and patients were also killed or injured. On average, more
than three people were killed in each incident involving at least one casualty.
These findings suggest that the number and severity of attacks on healthcare infrastructure
and personnel in Syria are the most extreme example of a disturbing worldwide phenomenon.
In 2016 alone, health facilities and health workers were attacked or subject to obstruction or
interference in at least 23 countries in conflict [1]. Attacks on healthcare globally have not
been systematically tracked, so comparisons between Syria and other areas of conflict cannot
be made with certainty. However, regardless of methodology used, reports of attacks in dozens
of countries over the past two decades reveal no other place in the world where so many hun-
dreds of hospitals have been attacked as has occurred in Syria [1,7]. Sound documentation of
attacks on and obstruction and interference with healthcare is essential to understand the
nature of the violence; causes for health worker migration from conflict zones; the short-,
intermediate-, and long-term consequences of such attacks on the health system; the potential
Table 4. Incident comparison between PHR and SAMS, 2016.
Organization Documented Incidents (2016) Noncomparable incidents Comparable Incidents (on facilities), by Classification
Relevant Incidents Definite match Probable Match Unique Incident
PHR 108 19 90 52 8 30
SAMS 200 23 177 117
 One incident was counted as a single incident by PHR and as two separate incidents by SAMS
 One incident was counted as a transport attack by SAMS but reported as a facility attack by PHR
Abbreviations: PHR, Physicians for Human Rights; SAMS, Syrian American Medical Society.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002559.t004
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means of preventing such attacks; and to build political will to stop the attacks and bring per-
petrators to justice [2].
Systematic data collection
There is wide agreement that sound methods to track attacks on and interference with health-
care facilities and personnel are essential. In collaboration with SAMS, we developed a stan-
dardized questionnaire for reporting attacks on healthcare in Syria that complements other
methods for documenting attacks developed by PHR and by the WHO health cluster for
northern Syria. Using the questionnaire, SAMS reported 102 attacks in the northern governor-
ates of Syria, but our analysis of all of SAMS’ incident data revealed that the tool was not used
in nearly half of the reported incidents. This experience suggests that it is challenging to utilize
a systematic, field-based data collection mechanism consistently during times of intense con-
flict but that, when it is used, it provides valuable, detailed information that can inform advo-
cacy and policy. We highlight that use of the data collection tool permitted comparisons in the
attacks based on size and type of health facility, presence of an emblem, operational capacity
after the attack, and source of information. It allowed for more nuanced information on
attacks that involved multiple domains of health services. However, use of the tool was consid-
ered lengthy and time consuming by some of the field data collectors. Use of this tool was feasi-
ble in this context, but to be used for each incident, we believe it requires a relatively high level
of administrative, technological, and epidemiological support. We also believe that simplifica-
tion of the questionnaire would be helpful, even at the cost of the absence of data collection on
certain topics. The research team has reviewed these concerns and is prepared to modify and
revise the tool to achieve the right balance between comprehensiveness and ease of use.
Using systematic data collection, we found that there is a significantly increased risk of mul-
tiple attacks on larger tertiary care hospitals. A more nuanced understanding of the damage
and destruction caused by these attacks is important in order to better gauge the health services
that these communities might require going forward. We note that only a small percentage of
facilities and transports had a medical emblem, suggesting in a context where emblems histori-
cally have protected from attack that they may be perceived to represent a vulnerability in
Syria. Similarly, the massive scale of attacks on hospitals in particular may represent the ease of
distinguishing these structures from the air and highlight the paradoxical humanitarian frame-
work at play in Syria, where signs of humanitarian operations may actually be a risk for attack.
Incident comparison
In collaboration with PHR, our findings also suggest that no one methodology currently used
to document attacks in Syria is sufficient to identify the full scope of the assaults. SAMS docu-
mented 177 attacks on health facilities, and PHR documented 90 confirmed incidents in the
comparable geographical region and time frame, but PHR received reports of at least 234 rele-
vant incidents in its aggregate database that includes both verified and unverified attacks. The
reasons for the difference is likely a product of the limitations of the methods used. For on-
the-ground reporting, such as that used by SAMS, the limitations are likely the inability to
access all areas to take reports; for the primarily open-source reporting used by PHR, the limi-
tations are likely the result of lack of media reporting of all incidents, as well as the high stan-
dard for corroboration required by PHR. By matching the incidents, we found that only 60 of
the incidents were matched between the two datasets. Thirty of the PHR incidents and 117 of
the SAMS incidents were not found in the other dataset. These figures highlight the difficulty
in capturing all incidents against healthcare in a challenging humanitarian context and illus-
trate the attacks that are likely being omitted by any single data collection mechanism.
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Collaborations among partners can provide in-depth detail while also helping to establish the
full breadth of the attacks. The UN Health Cluster for northern Syria, of which SAMS is a
member, utilizes such a collective methodology and has reported 158 verified incidents
between November 2015 and December 2016 [23].
A subsidiary finding is that the data collection program appears to have empowered local
communities with whom data collectors interacted to contribute to the documentation of inci-
dents. This type of on-the-ground system can potentially help energize communities, present
useful, real-time data, and contribute to advocacy and diplomatic channels in the context of
some quantitative data. Our colleagues at SAMS have used this data to inform their advocacy
and programming efforts.
Limitations
The study has some important limitations. We utilized a previously validated survey tool based
in international humanitarian law to develop a standardized approach to documenting attacks
on health globally. However, all conflicts are unique, and further work may be needed to adapt
the tool to capture attacks in other settings.
Documentation in this challenging, complex, and violent context of civil conflict is limited
by the accessibility of the hospitals and the willingness of staff, victims, and witnesses to discuss
their experiences, leading to under- or over-reporting. SAMS utilized data collectors who live
and work among the communities where they documented attacks. While this familiarity with
the culture and community may have mitigated any hesitancy to discuss violence, witnesses
may still have been reluctant to share information due to personal and/or security risks. Addi-
tionally, the data collectors were limited in their ability to document attacks during times of
high risk to their own safety or when excessive attacks in a short time frame would limit their
ability to visit various incident sites. We note that while reports from major incidents or
attacks on larger facilities may have been more rapidly transmitted than those on smaller facili-
ties, data collectors and SAMS staff made great efforts to ensure that attacks on smaller facili-
ties and individuals were regularly surveilled.
The data on the overall number of attacks as reported by SAMS come from two different
collection methods: the simple reporting of key details about an event by text messaging and
more in-depth information about incidents available through the systematic data collection
tool. It is possible that there were qualitative differences between the attacks reported via the
systematic data collection tool and those reported elsewhere. In our review of the underlying
incidents, we did not identify any relevant patterns in how a particular type of event was
reported; however, it is possible that they exist. The use of mobile technology, though it ren-
dered more details about specific incidents, was not used in about half of the incidents, sug-
gesting that the program will require further revisions and training to ensure that it is used
more consistently. Sporadic interruptions of cellular reception and internet connectivity were
also reported to limit use of mobile data collection and transmission.
We note that this program did not include a formal system for secondary or tertiary verifi-
cation of incidents. However, SAMS data managers utilized a variety of methods to ensure
data quality, including checking all incidents among the health cluster network, corroborating
with other field staff and health personnel, communicating back and forth with data collectors,
and gathering photographic and video evidence to ensure data quality. While there may be a
role for the larger health cluster to use formal mechanisms and external reports to verify each
incident, SAMS’ role was to create a reliable and accurate system of original reporting. Never-
theless, the findings of this study are based on reports that have been extensively checked and
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authenticated. We did not discern any differences in verification between Magpi-reported
incidents and others.
Because of the frequency of bombing and shelling of health facilities, the majority of our data
involve such events. While we documented some incidents of attacks on personnel independent
of facility attacks, our data likely understate these assaults, as well as obstructions of access to
care, since they may garner limited attention in comparison to incendiary strikes. The survey
tool was developed to document attacks across all domains, which may be more frequently uti-
lized in other violent conflicts. There is also a risk of reporting bias. Although data collectors
documented attacks within hours or, at most, a few days of an attack, there may be recall bias or
other reporting bias in the surveys. Attacks on larger health facilities may be more likely to be
reported, while attacks on smaller facilities may be underreported, potentially because there is
less impact or fewer staff or witnesses to report the incident. Another source of possible bias is
in the political views of data collectors and witnesses. In almost all cases, photographic evidence
and multiple victim corroborations have assisted in mitigating the likelihood of bias.
We evaluated the SAMS and PHR data for independence in their methodologies. SAMS
staff does not coordinate with PHR for its data collection or vice versa. PHR’s data was retro-
spectively reviewed, as they do not have any staff on the ground in Syria and utilize social and
news media accounts of attacks. SAMS data collectors arrive at the scene of the attack and use
nonmedia means of obtaining information on attacks on health, including eyewitness
accounts, networking with administrators and health staff, and private SAMS messaging
groups. Ideally, our comparative analysis would have utilized more than one partner, but given
the constraints of setting, limited collection of this type of data, and the challenges in collecting
detailed information on attacks, we believe our approach offers the most comprehensive
understanding of attacks on healthcare in Syria to date.
Conclusion
This study shows the potential contribution of employing field data collectors in documenting
attacks on healthcare. Along with reporting by health cluster organizations (as WHO has
shown) and analysis of photographic, video, media, social media, and other materials (as PHR
has done), dedicated field data collectors can collect direct and powerful evidence of attacks.
Standardized questions can yield detailed, consistent information, and the use of a mobile
application can allow secure and quick transmission of data.
Tracking attacks on healthcare is vitally important for three purposes. First, sound data
about attacks is essential to help the global community know exactly what attacks are taking
place, where they are taking place, what their impacts are, and, in some cases, who the perpe-
trator is. Second, it is essential to stimulate action at the international level that can prevent
future attacks, promote investigations, and ultimately hold perpetrators accountable. Third, it
can assist organizations in designing harm mitigation strategies, as SAMS has previously
attempted [41]. The ongoing attacks on healthcare in Syria illustrate how critical it is to use
every mechanism possible to develop political will to stop the attacks, conduct investigations,
and prosecute those who commit these abuses and violate international law.
The analysis also suggests a far higher level of attacks on healthcare in Syria than previously
reported. We highlight that, beyond the violent injuries that are documented in this manu-
script, there must be an informed discussion of the consequence for mortality and morbidity
that results from the destruction of the healthcare infrastructure, including from communica-
ble diseases, lack of preventative care, exacerbations of chronic conditions, limited-capacity
prevention programs, and the fear of seeking out healthcare services when they are seen as a
target for attack.
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This study also demonstrates the capacity of locally based organizations and data collectors,
in collaboration with physicians and other health staff, to contribute to documentation of
attacks on health using a mobile systematic data collection application and act as potent agents
to report and chronicle this violence.
The UN Security Council, as part of Resolution 2286 passed on May 3, 2016, “condemns
acts of violence, attacks and threats against the wounded and sick, medical personnel and
humanitarian personnel . . . as well as hospitals and other facilities and demands that all parties
of conflicts comply with their obligations under international law” [13]. WHO is mandated to
“provide leadership at the global level in developing methods for systematic collection and dis-
semination of data on attacks” [15]. WHO is beginning implementation of its global system,
and as its methodology develops, it can consider the uses of field data collectors as part of
meeting the enormous challenges in standardizing data collection methods for attacks on
healthcare. Additionally, NGOs and other entities in conflicts where healthcare is under attack
can use the questionnaire and mobile application and field data collectors to gain data about
the attacks. We hope that the development of this tool and the reporting that results will assist
in setting a course to secure compliance with international law and end impunity.
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